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Abstract
Multi-application smart card technology has gained momentum due to the Near Field Communication (NFC)
and smart phone revolution. Enabling multiple applications from diﬀerent application providers on a single
smart card is not a new concept. Multi-application smart cards have been around since the late 1990s; however,
uptake was severely limited. NFC has recently reinvigorated the multi-application initiative and this time
around a number of innovative deployment models are proposed. Such models include Trusted Service Manager
(TSM), User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) and GlobalPlatform Consumer-Centric Model
(GP-CCM). In this paper, we discuss two of the most widely accepted and deployed smart card management
architectures in the smart card industry: GlobalPlatform and Multos. We explain how these architectures do
not fully comply with the UCOM and GP-CCM. We then describe our novel ﬂexible consumer-centric card
management architecture designed speciﬁcally for the UCOM and GP-CCM frameworks, along with ways of
integrating the TSM model into the proposed card management architecture. Finally, we discuss four new
security issues inherent to any architecture in this context along with the countermeasures for our proposed
architecture.
Keywords: Smart Card, GlobalPlatform, Java Card, Multos, User Centric Smart Cards, Card Management
Architecture.
1. Introduction
Existing multi-application smart card platforms (e.g. Java [39], Multos [35]) support the installation of ap-
plications remotely (post-issuance). Standardisation eﬀorts that enable an application to be managed remotely
 for example, GlobalPlatform [21] have been eﬀective in the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(ICOM) ﬁeld [4]. The advent of NFC technology and the growing convergence of diﬀerent services on mobile5
phones have prompted GlobalPlatform and the GSMA1 to propose a new application management architecture
(e.g. TSM) [24, 26, 20, 30]. Similarly, Multos has a strong card and application management architecture that is
heavily issuer-centric and it can be argued that it can easily be adapted to the Trusted Service Manager (TSM)
architecture. The GlobalPlatform and Multos cards along with their associated application management ar-
chitectures provide two contrasting views of the smart card industry. We limit our analysis of traditional card10
management architectures to these two examples. The Java Card does not have any associated management ar-
chitecture and in most commercial deployments it is coupled with the GlobalPlatform management architecture.
In the ICOM, the issued smart cards are under the complete control of the card issuer. By contrast, in the User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) [4] the consumers (end-users) get freedom of choice which
allows them to install or delete any application as they desire from their smart cards. The UCOM supported15
smart cards can hold multiple heterogeneous applications from various organisations. The only limitation on the
number of applications a UCOM supported smart can have is based on its store capacity. The GlobalPlatform
Consumer-Centric Model (GP-CCM) [27] provides consumers the ability to choose the applications they want.
Although the ﬁner details for the GP-CCM are still to be articulated, we consider that the overarching aim
of both UCOM and GP-CCM are similar. In this paper, the expression Consumer-Centric Model is used for20
conciseness to indicate both UCOM and GP-CCM. As the card management architecture in the Consumer-
Centric Model has to consider the contrasting needs of both the administrative authority (i.e. TSM) [7] and
the consumers (end-users), it has to remain ﬂexible. It must determine the ownership requirements of each of
1The GSM Association (GSMA) is an association that represents the interests of mobile operators worldwide, along with
developing and prompting the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) speciﬁcation.
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these entities and then articulate how a Consumer-Centric Model framework will manage them. In addition, the
management architecture proposed in this paper deals with application issuance (lease), application domain pro-25
vision on the smart card, installation, deletion, and application/domain management. Furthermore, this paper
an arhitecture for the proposed application download/installation protocols [8, 7, 9]. As the Consumer-Centric
card management architecture brings forward conﬂicting views smart card management architectures, it also
highlights new security issues. These issues relate to the card and its rightful owner. They include simulator
problems, user ownership issues, parasite application problems, and platform insider attacker problems.30
1.1. Contributions
The salient contributions of this paper are to:
1. Describe and compare traditional application management architectures (Multos and GlobalPlatform)
and justify why they might not be considered as adequate for the Consumer-Centric Model
2. Specify a ﬂexible card management architecture for the Consumer-Centric Model35
3. Provide a ﬂexible card management architecture for the integrated TSM and Consumer-Centric Models
4. Discuss the security issues and related countermeasures for the proposed architecture
1.2. Structure of the paper
The GlobalPlatform card management architecture is discussed in section 2, followed by the Multos card
management architecture in section 3. The proposed architecture of the Consumer-Centric card management is40
described in section 4, along with diﬀerent types of relationships between a user and a Service Provider2 (SP).
In section 5, we discuss the issues that are inherent to any architecture in this context along with providing
related countermeasures for our proposed architecture.
2. GlobalPlatform Card Management Architecture
In this section we discuss the GlobalPlatform card management architecture along with the mechanics by45
which it supports TSM-based card management.
2.1. Architecture Overview
The GlobalPlatform card security requirement speciﬁcation [21] speciﬁes eight entities (excluding the smart
card and the cardholder) that perform various tasks in the overall card management architecture. The overall
architecture is depicted in ﬁgure 1, which is a simplistic representation of the architecture described in [21].50
The shaded entities in ﬁgure 1 have diﬀerent titles and roles, but together they form the card issuer. The term
card issuer as deﬁned by GlobalPlatform in [21] is restrictive, so that issuers only have the responsibility to
acquire the smart cards, set a security policy, and issue cards to individual cardholders. The card administrator
is responsible for managing the cards once they are issued to individual customers. If application provider
would like to issue its applications, these must ﬁrst be veriﬁed by the veriﬁcation authority. The veriﬁcation55
authority performs an oﬀ-card application code veriﬁcation to ascertain whether the given code conforms to
the security policy set by the card issuer. Once the veriﬁcation is performed, the application provider requests
the controlling authority to give permission to load the application. The controlling authority checks the
veriﬁcation authority's veriﬁcation and issues the permission to load the application. If the application is going
to be loaded at the pre-issuance stage then the domain keys and data will be sent to the card issuer [22]60
through the card enabler. Otherwise, the domain keys and data will be sent to the application loader. In
ﬁgure 1, we opt for the pre-issuance model. Finally, the application provider will send its application, keys
and application personalisation data to the application loader, which will load them onto the smart cards of
individual customers. The keys in aforementioned message, used to secure the application download to a smart
card, are security domain keys. In ﬁgure 1 the security domain keys that are used by the application provider65
to manage its domain are loaded onto the smart card through the card enabler (i.e. card issuer) [23]. However,
a later addendum to the GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation [23] permitted the generation and loading of keys
without the active involvement of a card issuer [25]. This extends the role of the Controlling Authority (GP-CA)3
by provisioning an on-card controlling entity (i.e. Controlling Authority Security Domain: CASD) that will be
2A Service Provider (SP) is an entity which is also referred as Application Provider (AP) that develops smart card applications
in order to facilitate its customers to securely access their services. The terms SP and AP are used interchangeably hereafter.
3A Controlling Authority is an oﬀ-card entity (e.g. card issuer) that has a security domain on the GlobalPlatform smart card.
Its role as deﬁned in the GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation [23] is to enforce the card issuer's security policy. In the GlobalPlatform
card speciﬁcation, the GP-CA has the power to sanction or evict any application from a smart card.
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responsible for generating and/or loading the application provider's cryptographic keys. The GlobalPlatform70
speciﬁcation supports two models: the push model in which the cryptographic keys are sent to the CASD by
the application provider, and the pull model that generates the cryptographic keys on the card and then sends
them to the application provider. The GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation [23] and its amendment [25] provides
a secure and reliable way to load the application provider's keys onto a smart card in a conﬁdential way. In all
fairness, the CASD proposal is not that diﬀerent to the original GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation (including75
the GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation amendment A [25]) where keys could be loaded by the card enabler at
pre-issuance. Note that the CASD (post-issuance loading) is under the control of the GP-CA. Both roles, card
enabler and GP-CA, are predominantly played by the card issuer. Nevertheless, the amendment provides a base
to accommodate the TSM architecture.
2.2. Support for Trusted Service Manager Architecture80
To provide a standardised architecture and facilitate the adoption of NFC-enabled mobile phones for various
services, GlobalPlatform proposed an architecture for the management of secure elements (these secure elements
can be smart cards in NFC mobile phones [24]). The TSM role speciﬁed by GlobalPlatform [24, 26] includes
managing the relationships between various actors in the smart card ecosystem. It does not handle any key
management or provide any trusted services [24]. GlobalPlatform proposes a new entity termed the Conﬁdential85
Key Loading Authority (CKLA) that will loads the initial key set onto the smart cards in a conﬁdential way.
It does not specify who will take the role of the CKLA. Additionally, it breaks down the role of GP-CA so
it can be performed by two diﬀerent (independent) actors. This role includes managing the CKLA and the
Mandated Data Authentication Pattern (Mandated DAP) Authority. The CKLA will facilitate the generation
and loading of keys using an Over-the-Air (OTA) framework. The DAP allows the application provider to90
sign its applications before they are loaded onto the smart card. The Mandated DAP Authority will verify
the signature and notify the application provider. Note that in any architecture, whether it is pre-issuance or
post-issuance application loading in the GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation [23] or application loading via OTA
in the NFC mobile phone [24], the loading of cryptographic keys is dependent on either the GP-CA or the
CKLA entities. These entities should be trusted by the application provider and their aim is to provide the key95
material for conﬁdential application loading and management to the respective application providers. Therefore,
such entities (e.g. GP-CA or CKLA) which in most cases belong to an oﬀ-card actor (i.e. card issuer), cannot
be accommodated in the UCOM proposal.
3. Multos Card Management Architecture
In this section, we discuss the Multos card management architecture and we explore how it can be adapted100
into the TSM architecture for NFC mobile phones.
3.1. Architecture Overview
The card management architecture for Multos is more straightforward than GlobalPlatform (section 2.1). An
overview of the Multos card management architecture is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 and discussed below. The shaded
entities in ﬁgure 2 represent various roles, but traditionally they reside with a single entity, for example the card105
issuer [36, 37]. An application provider will generate a signature key pair and application code; the private key
of the application provider along with the application code is securely communicated to the application load
unit generator. The signature key is used to generate a cryptographically protected application load unit (i.e.
downloadable application). The application provider will also send its signature veriﬁcation key and application
header to the card issuer, which forwards it to the Multos Certiﬁcation Authority (M-CA). The application110
header is a data structure that contains information regarding the application, which includes the application
identity, hash of the application code, code and data size [36]. The M-CA can be either the card manufacturer,
or an authorised entity of the Multos consortium [35]. The role of the M-CA is to issue an application load
or delete certiﬁcate to the card issuer for the speciﬁc application. In addition, the M-CA also provides the list
of public keys for individual Multos cards that have been issued by the card issuer. This list of public keys115
remains with the application load unit generator as the keys are used to encrypt individual applications. This
transfer of public keys is marked as user personalisation data in ﬁgure 2. The application load unit generator
will create application load units for individual smart cards only if the load unit has to be encrypted. Finally,
the load unit include the application code, digital signature on the application using application provider's
signature key. Optionally, the whole load unit may be encryptec by the public key of the smart card. The120
application load facility will have the application load units and associated M-CA's certiﬁcates that will can
be use for loading the application onto individual smart cards. It is evident from ﬁgure 2 that application
providers have to communicate their application (in plaintext) and their private keys to the application load
unit generator (i.e. card issuer). Furthermore, the application management tasks (i.e. installation, deletion, and
updating etc.) have to be performed through the card issuer and/or the M-CA. Unlike the GlobalPlatform,125
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Multos speciﬁcations do not provide independent application management architecture. The process of deleting
a Multos application is similar to the Multos application installation except that there is no need to generate
an application load unit but rather an application delete certiﬁcate from the M-CA.
3.2. Support for Trusted Service Manager Architecture
To the best of our knowledge, there are no oﬃcial proposals on how to incorporate Multos into a proposed130
TSM architecture for NFC mobile phones. However, in a centralised environment a TSM can take the role of
the M-CA and application load unit generator.
4. Proposed Flexible Consumer-Centric Card Management Architecture
In our proposal, the card management architecture is divided into two categories depending on whether the
card is under administrative control or not. Therefore, these two categories are referred to as administrative and135
user card-management, corresponding to the Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards (CASC) architecture [7]
and the UCOM architecture [4], respectively.
4.1. Administrative Card Management Architecture
In the administrative card management architecture, a smart card is under the shared ownership of an
administrative authority and the respective cardholder. The architecture is shown in ﬁgure 3 and the dotted140
lines in this ﬁgure represent optional messages. The card manufacturer gets its product evaluated by a third
party that issues an evaluation certiﬁcate. The smart cards are then acquired by the administrative authority
that takes administrative control and issues the cards to individual cardholders. The cardholder then obtains
the card ownership, under certain terms and conditions. The cardholder has to register with the relevant SP
to gain access to the corresponding application. The registration process generates customer credentials that145
are issued by the SP and used by cardholders to download the application(s) onto their smart cards. The
cardholder then provides these credentials to the smart card along with the details of the SP's application
server [2]. Before the SP leases its application, it requests the smart card to provide a security assurance,
which is furnished by providing the evaluation certiﬁcate and a validation proof [3]. The SP then sends the
application identity to the smart card, which will check whether the application belongs to the administrative150
authority's partner: partners are referred to as syndicated members. The smart card has a list of syndicated
members that is provided by the administrative authority. If the SP is registered as a syndicated member of
the administrative authority, it will then reveal the identity of the administrative authority. Under the scenario
in which the SP is a syndicated member, the SP will then contact the administrative authority to authorise
the installation. Upon successful authorisation, the application is leased to the smart card and installed in the155
administrative authority's space [7]. If the SP is not a syndicated member, then the application is installed
under the authorisation of the cardholder and she might be charged for it, which is represented by a use charge
message sent from the smart card to the administrative authority. Subsequently, the administrative authority
processes the request and issues an application installation authorisation message to the smart card. On
receipt of this message, the smart card will allow the application to execute. It will generate an application160
download certiﬁcate that acts as a contract between the smart card and the SP. The contract signiﬁes that the
application was downloaded succesfully onto the smart card and it is enabled to communicate with the SP. The
administrative card management architecture can easily be adapted into the TSM architecture by replacing the
administrative authority with the TSM. However, the shared ownership principle has to be accommodated by
the TSM architecture to comply with the CASC. In paper [7], the Application Acquisition and Contractual165
Agreement Protocol supports the basic design of the administrative management architecture.
4.2. User Card Management Architecture
In the user card management architecture there is no administrative authority. The user card management
architecture is depicted in ﬁgure 4 and is described below. The smart card establishes a secure communication
channel with the SP and this is in order to provide smart card security and reliability assurance to the SP,170
facilitate the generation of domain management credentials, and download the application. In the Consumer-
Centric Model, whether it is under administrative or user management, each SP gets its own domain. The SP's
domain management credentials are mutually generated by the SP and the smart card without involving any
oﬀ-card entity (e.g. including the card manufacturer). Applications are downloaded directly to the SP's domain
using the cryptographic keys mutually generated by the smart card and the SP, in contrast to GlobalPlatform175
that uses either a push or pull model for key sharing (section 2.1), or Multos that require an application provider
to reveal its application code and signature key to Application Load Unit Generator . Note that the two variants
of the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (STCP), referred to as STCPSP [9] and STCPSC [10] support the
user card management architecture.
4
4.3. Types of Application Leases180
An application lease refers to the issuance of an application to the requesting smart card under some terms
and conditions that are stipulated by the Application Lease Policy [2]. In this section, we discuss the various
types of application leases that an SP can issue.
1. Card Bound Application Lease: In this lease, an SP issues its application to a speciﬁc smart card and
lease is only bound to the particular smart card. Therefore, an SP will only issue one lease per user, which185
can be associated with any of her smart cards; examples of such a lease may be credit card and (U)SIM
card applications.
2. User Bound Application Lease: This lease is bound to the user, not to her smart card. She can install the
given application on any number of her smart cards. Examples of such a lease may be Internet Identity
applications [19, 14].190
3. Open Application Lease: The open application lease does not bind the lease to either a user or a smart
card. Any smart card, and any user can download this application. Examples of such applications may
be pre-paid mobile telephone cards, pre-paid calling cards, hotel room access cards, and transport cards.
One thing to note is that these examples are only valid if they do not require any user registration before
and after application is issued.195
4.4. Possible Relationships between a Cardholder and an SP
The lease issued to a cardholder discussed in the previous section would be based on a relationship that an
SP has with a particular cardholder. In this section, we discuss various possible relationships that can exist
between an SP and a cardholder.
1. Pre-Registration: This scenario deals with applications that are only issued to registered and pre-authorised200
customers. Such applications can be banking, health centres, identity, travel documents, and telecom (e.g.
post-pay accounts) that require proof that the requesting user is actually the current owner of the smart
card. This relationship is valid for the card- and user-bound application leases discussed in the previous
section.
2. Post-Registration: The post-registration relationship allows a cardholder to download an application205
without being a registered customer. However, the application does not go into service unless the user
registers herself with the application (or its respective SP). This type of relationship can be valid for all
three types of application leases. There are two possible cases:
a) the SP is only concerned with the security assurance and validation of the smart card platform and
does not require user registration (anybody can download and use their application) or210
b) at least during the application lease process, the SP is not concerned with user registration. However,
once the application is downloaded the SP can initiate the user registration process.
The latter option is like a user registering for a service for the ﬁrst time. Examples of applications that can
be downloaded in this scenario include pre-paid telecom applications, transport, and hotel room access
applications.215
3. No-Registration: This option does not require any registration, before or after the application is issued.
It is suitable for the open application lease category. Examples include hotel room access cards, ﬁxed
pre-paid calling cards, and pre-paid gift cards.
4.5. Application Installation
In this section, the processes that support the secure transmission and installation of an application are220
discussed. The installation process discussed in this section builds additional checks around the application
installation protocols (discussed in [9, 7, 10]). The installation request will initiate the process of acquiring an





These sub-processes are explained below.
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1. Downloading: The downloading of an application is initiated by the smart card, through a secure channel
protocol [9, 10]. At the conclusion of the secure channel protocol, both entities generate a set of keys230
for application download and domain management. The smart card then generates an SP's domain,
provided it has enough space to accommodate it. The SP and smart card will then start the application
downloading process. The SP will ﬁrst generate a signature on the application, then encrypt and MAC it
before sending it to the smart card. The smart card checks the generated MAC, decrypts the application,
and veriﬁes the signature. A decrypted application is not a fully installed application  it is the equivalent235
of copying an application to a memory location. The next step is to verify whether the application complies
with the smart card's operational and security policy. For this purpose an on-card byte code veriﬁcation
is performed [16], which is already mandated by the Java Card 3 [39]; this can be based on the well-
deﬁned on-card byte code veriﬁcation proposals [15, 33, 16, 34]. Furthermore, additional runtime checks
are performed that are discussed by [1]. The Consumer-Centric Model, especially the UCOM, does not240
mandate the security evaluation of an application. However, certain applications require evaluation due
to government or industry regulations (e.g. EMV applications). In these cases, an SP's application(s)
provides an evaluation certiﬁcate (e.g. Application Assurance Certiﬁcate: AAC). To verify the certiﬁcate
the smart card would have to calculate the hash of the downloaded application and compare it with the
AAC.245
2. Localisation: First, the application will be personalised by the SP. Depending upon the relationship
between the cardholder and the SP, at the SP's discretion the personalisation can include acquiring user
details (in post and no-registration scenarios), and cryptographic key generation. Furthermore, if the
SP is issuing a card-bound lease then it will make sense to generate on-card cryptographic keys as they
will automatically become device identiﬁers because each lease of the application will have a diﬀerent250
set of keys. After personalisation, the downloaded application establishes connections with various on-
card services (i.e. shareable resources) that are provided by partner applications. To access a partner's
application services, the downloaded application will establish an application sharing relationship that is
discussed in detail in [5].
3. Application Registration: The ﬁnal stage of an application installation is the application registration by255
the SP. The registration will allow the particular instance of the application to access sanctioned services.
Once the SP registers (sanctions) the downloaded application, the smart card will also make it selectable
to an oﬀ-card entity. By making an application selectable, the smart card allows the application to execute
and access on-card services, and communicate with oﬀ-card entities.
4.6. Application Deletion260
The application deletion process has similar steps to the application installation but they are taken in the
opposite direction. The installed application will ﬁrst establish a connection with the SP and signal the deletion.
It will initiate the de-registration process that will restrict the leased application's access to the SP's services.
The smart card will also make it un-selectable for oﬀ-card entities; in addition, any interdependencies will
be resolved. As most of the interdependencies that the deleted application might have are the result of the265
application sharing mechanism, the smart card ﬁrewall mechanism will cascade the deletion event to the related
(partner) applications [5]. The interdependencies that might exist between various applications on a smart card
may end up creating a feature interaction problem. Finally, the SP's domain key material, and registration
with various card services are deleted by the Card Security Manager [23].
5. Consumer-Centric Card Management-Related Issues270
In this section, we discuss the potential issues related to card management architecture introduced by the
Consumer-Centric Models. We also propose countermeasures to the issues discussed in this section.
5.1. Simulator Problem
In the context of the Consumer-Centric Models, the simulator problem refers to a possible scenario in which
a malicious user could remotely install an application onto a smart card simulator. One thing to note is that the275
simulator problem is only related to remote installation and not to on-site installation. In remote installation,
a smart card is not present at an SP's site, and the application is downloaded over the internet. Therefore,
an SP needs a way of making sure that its application is not installed on a simulated card. It can be asserted
that simulators are used in a number of diﬀerent environments, especially mobile application development, and
do not present a substantial security issue in the mobile application environment. Nevertheless, the nature280
of an application installed on a smart card is diﬀerent to an application on a mobile phone. The smart card
application might represent the identity of the user, along with serving as a security token to access some
services (including ﬁnancial services). Furthermore, the service or business environment that a smart card
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application deals with is substantially diﬀerent from that of a mobile phone application. In the ICOM, the
simulator problem is not relevant, as applications are predominantly installed by the card issuer before the285
smart cards are issued to individual users. This stage in the smart card lifecycle is also referred as the pre-
issuance stage. The GlobalPlatform card speciﬁcation provides the architecture for application installation
under the application provider's control, after the smart cards are issued to customers. GlobalPlatform deﬁnes
a secure entity on the smart card referred to as the Card Manager, along with associated domains [23]. The
SP requires symmetric/asymmetric keys in order to gain access to the domains (application domains) and290
install applications. The assumption in the ICOM is that malicious users cannot access or retrieve these keys.
The basis of this assumption is the tamper-resistance properties of the smart card hardware  that is, the
assumption is based on trust in the card manufacturer or a third party evaluator (e.g. Common Criteria [17]
evaluation laboratory). In the Consumer-Centric Model, the problem is not only verifying the existence of a
smart card, but also validating that it is in a secure and reliable state. In a simulator attack, a malicious295
user has a stand-alone simulator that enables him to simulate the Consumer-Centric Model environment. To
do so, the adversary has to have knowledge of the cryptographic keys and any related attestation mechanism
(regardless of whether it is based on PRNGs [13] or PUFs [12]). If the attestation mechanism is based on PUFs
then the adversary should be able to emulate the PUF for a genuine smart card. He can then try to acquire
an application from an SP, install it on the simulator, and potentially attack the application; that may include300
reverse engineering the application, retrieving the sensitive user and application data (e.g. cryptographic keys).
5.1.1. Countermeasure to the Simulator Problem
The countermeasure to the simulator problem has to deal with physical and side-channel attacks along
with the risk of compromising the communication protocol(s). The countermeasure for consumer-centric card
management architecture is based on three aspects of the UCOM architecture that are listed as below:305
1. Security evaluation of the smart card platform, which certiﬁes that the smart card is tamper-resistant,
and eﬀective against state-of-the-art attacks [3].
2. Self and remote attestation mechanism [13, 12].
3. A secure and reliable entity authentication and key sharing protocol [9, 10].
The evaluation and validation of the smart card provides (time-limited) assurance against the simulator attack.310
If during the lifetime of the smart card, an attack vector is discovered that can compromise the card's security
and make a simulator attack feasible, the evaluation authority (and the card manufacturer) can revoke the
certiﬁcates, and the SP can blacklist the aﬀected smart cards. Because of such attacks, smart cards can
be rendered useless. Therefore, card manufacturers, even today, are compelled to build a strong product or
otherwise security issues would damage the reputation of their brand, and the same would be true in the case315
of the UCOMs. Finally, a secure channel protocol should be designed in a way that would make it impossible
for an adversary to retrieve the keys shared between a smart card and an SP. To provide protection against
simulator attacks, SPs can request device attestation as described in [6]. The device attestation is based on a
protocol, which involves the card manufacturer at the time of application lease attesting that its smart card
is secure and reliable as stated by the evaluation certiﬁcate [3]. Therefore, an evaluation certiﬁcate from an320
independent third party will conﬁrm that the smart card is secure against complete and partial simulations.
The online attestation mechanism provides a validation that the smart card is still in conformance with the
state in which it was evaluated. Finally, by integrating the smart card assurance and validation mechanism into
the secure channel protocols, the UCOM can avoid simulator problems.
5.2. User Ownership Issues325
In this section, we discuss an issue that is related to the identity of the smart card owner and the authorised
user who can download an application from an SP. This issue arises in the pre-registration relationship (section
4.4) between an SP and a cardholder. During an application installation, a cardholder will provide her credentials
to the SP that leases the application. In this situation, the SP requires that the application can only be
downloaded to a smart card that is under the ownership of the authorised user. The aim of an adversary may330
be to acquire the credentials of an authorised user for a particular SP in order to use them to download the
application onto his smart card. If the SP does not issue card-bound leases (section 4.3), both entities (the
authorised user and the adversary) can download the application.
5.2.1. Countermeasure to User Ownership Issues
To avoid this situation, the SP could require proof of ownership to be produced by the smart card for335
the given user during the application download process. The proof of ownership can be based on a signature
key pair belonging to the user, which is certiﬁed by the smart card itself or by its card manufacturer. The
issue is that a similar certiﬁcate can also be requested by an adversary for the given authorised user, if the
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malicious user knows enough personal information relating to the genuine user. Having the smart card signing
the certiﬁcate is easy, and it also allows the user the independence to sell/give her smart card to other users.340
On the other hand, including the card manufacturer in the user identiﬁcation and issuance of certiﬁcates to
individual users provides similar protection as the previous proposal, without eﬀectively increasing the overall
security. Therefore, we prefer the smart card to sign the certiﬁcate rather than the card manufacturer. Another
possibility is that the smart card user can register her smart card physically (oine) with the SP. The smart
card can later access the SP server through the internet to download the application. If there are no adequate345
checks during the oine registration, an adversary could perform the same process and then use the credentials
associated with the user and request the application lease. Furthermore, this solution also complicates the
relationship between the user and the SP as there may not always be the possibility for physical access to the
SP's oﬃce (e.g. online gaming website). An optimum solution can be based on one-time credentials issued by
SPs. We assume that an SP issues a one-time credential (e.g. password) to a user to download its application350
to her smart card. Therefore, even if an adversary was to gain access to the credentials, he cannot use them
to download the application. Furthermore, if an application is already leased to a user, an SP can reject any
subsequent requests for an application lease unless the user either deletes the previous lease or loses the smart
card. Therefore, in the case that the application is deleted and the user wants to install the application on her
new smart card, the SP will issue a new one-time credential to the user, to download the relevant application.355
A malicious user cannot fake the deletion of the application, as in the UCOM deletion process an application
communicates with the SP in order to notify it of the deletion and also to perform any required housekeeping
tasks. Therefore, the SP knows beforehand that the application is deleted so for a malicious user it is diﬃcult
to fake application deletion. Furthermore, if a user loses her smart card then she can use an authorisation token
(issued by the SP and discussed in [11]) to acquire an application. An authorisation token is a short encrypted360
structure issued by an SP and it acts as an authorisation credential to download an application. If she does
not have the authorisation token, then the user can contact the SP and request the issuance of new credentials.
This is similar to the process after a user loses her smart card in the ICOM, where she has to contact the card
issuer to get a new smart card.
5.3. Parasite Application Problem365
In the parasite application problem, an installed application masquerades as the UCOM-based smart card
referred as a User Centric Smart Card (UCSC) on which it is installed. This is possible because a UCSC allows
an installed application to request the platform/application state validation from the Trusted Environment &
Execution Manager (TEM) [1]. Regarding GP-CCM, the architecture has not been speciﬁed enough to assess
if this problem is relevant. In this attack as shown in ﬁgure 5, an adversary (A) has installed his malicious370
application (AppMalicious) on a UCSC. The AppMalicious implements the application download protocols that
are discussed in [9, 10]. The adversary (A) then requests the installation of an application from an SP through
the AppMalicious, represented by message one in ﬁgure 5. In response, the SP asks the UCSC for the security
validation to avoid a simulator attack and this request is sent to the AppMalicious. The AppMalicious then asks
the TEM for the security validation [12]. At the successful conclusion of the security validation process, the375
card manufacturer produces a certiﬁcate (as part of the online validation proof [12, 13]) that for privacy reasons
does not include the identity of the requesting SP as described in the online attestation protocol [13]. Therefore,
the AppMalicious can communicate this certiﬁcate to the requesting SP as validation in message ﬁve depicted in
ﬁgure 5) and may be able to start the application download process. The A might have designed the application
as if it will communicate the downloaded application oﬀ-card, which will enable A to retrieve the application380
code and data.
5.3.1. Countermeasure to Parasite Application Problem
To avoid this problem, there are four possible solutions: 1) restrict the security assurance validation request
to oﬀ-card entities and any installed applications should not be allowed to request it, 2) include the identity
of the requesting SP in the security assurance validation certiﬁcate during the application installation process,385
3) include the identity of the application requesting the security assurance validation during the application
installation: the request is initiated by the card security manager [21], or 4) avoid generating the signature
(as validation proof) as part of the security validation if it is requested by an application, but use the shared
symmetric keys between the TEM and the application [5]. From the above listed options, we consider that
option four is appropriate for the UCOM environment to prevent the parasite application problem. In option390
four, the TEM will only sign the security validation proof if it is requested by the card security manager and
not by an application. Therefore, an application installed on a UCSC cannot request (message 3 in ﬁgure
5) a (signed) security validation proof from the TEM, which would prohibit the application from eﬀectively
masquerading as the respective UCSC.
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5.4. Platform Insider Attacker Problem395
In the multiapplication context, the fear of the smart card platform owners is related to the insider attacker
problem. Indeed a successful attack can damage their businesses and the reputation of their brands [40]. To avoid
this problem in ICOM, GlobalPlatform and Multos card management architecture are used to lock and control
trust in platform (authorisation to load are granted only after a trust establishment: e.g. in Multos architecture
the application is installed after the whole code is evaluated; similarly, in GlobalPlatform architecture this is400
achieved by oﬀ-card veriﬁcation with code signature and some business agreements including potential damages
between card issuer and SP). The card locking and control mechanism, which is under a centralised authority
(e.g. card issuer) guarantees that a malicious application would not be installed on the smart cards. In the
Consumer-Centric Model, the paradigm is shifted and the user is the owner of the platform and he/she may act
maliciously.405
5.4.1. Countermeasure to Platform Insider Attacker Problem
To enforce card security, as stated in section 4.5, an embedded byte code veriﬁer in addition to the ﬁrewall
is required (GP-CCM also mentions them as on-board platform security mechanisms). However some attacks
may still be possible. For this reason, but also for instance to avoid the whole certiﬁcation of the platform and
all embedded applications, GlobalPlatform is working on a Composition Model [28, 29] to allow post-issuance410
application loading while maintaining trust. To make the Consumer-Centric Model attractive even for the
small and medium scale organisations as a target architecture of their applications, SPs are not required to get
a third party evaluation certiﬁcate for their application. Thus it may limit the potential of the market to only
big companies and this is not satisfying. An additional countermeasure can be to assume that the UCSC are
supported with state-of-the-art security mechanisms and thus they might be resistant against attacks like:415
1. the use of installed applications to identify power consumption or electromagnetic leakage patterns [18, 41]
2. combined attacks (software and physical attacks like optical fault or voltage glitches) [42]
3. software only attacks that may bypass the embedded byte code veriﬁcation [33], like those on transaction
mechanism [38] which took advantage of the bug in the implementation of the transaction mechanism to
create ill-typed code. Note that the attacks on the shareable interface mechanisms cited in [38] were420
only working on cards without byte code veriﬁcation.
Protection against these attacks can be achieved through eﬃcient shield and defensive Virtual Machines [32,
31]. In [38], authors stated that runtime type checking oﬀered an excellent protection against ill-typed code.
Therefore, the proposal for the TEM [1] in the UCOM ecosystem has introduced a runtime security manager
that goes beyond the traditional notion of a trusted and secure execution environment. It oversees the execution425
of the application and manages diﬀerent aspects of the runtime environment. The aim of the runtime security
manager is to ensure the security of the UCSC platform and provide a trusted execution environment to
individual applications. If an application behaves maliciously the UCSC will prohibit the application from
executing and to a further extend delete or block the application.
6. Conclusion430
In this paper, we discussed the widely accepted and deployed card management architectures: GlobalPlatform
and Multos. GlobalPlatform is more open to independent application management by application providers,
whereas Multos is a hardcore ICOM architecture that requires an authorisation from a centralised authority
(i.e. Multos Certiﬁcation Authority) before an application can be installed or deleted. Furthermore, Multos also
requires that application providers should reveal their application codes to the Multos application load unit gen-435
erator. We then described a ﬂexible consumer-centric card management architecture followed by the application
lease types, and the various kinds of relationships a consumer can have with an SP. Next, we discussed the ap-
plication installation and deletion approach. Finally, we discussed new security issues (including simulator, user
ownership, parasite application problems and platform insider attacker problems) in the general context of the
Consumer-Centric Model. We suggested that the TSM can co-exist with the Consumer-Centric Model: in fact440
one can argue that the merger of TSM with the Consumer-Centric Model might resolve many of the issues that
have plagued the multi-application smart card initiative from the beginning. The scope of discussion related to
the security issues was intentionally kept short. We have only included the issues raised due to the changes in the
management of a smart card and not included issues raised by Consumer-Centric Model in general. For future
multiapplication smart card deployments, we consider that the application management architecture proposed445
by the UCOM could provide a robust, scalable and ﬂexible architecture. Adoption of the UCOM-based ecosys-
tem even in TSM-based service deployments will be beneﬁcial to all stakeholders. Consumer-centric ecosystems
have now matured to such a level that they should be adopted for smart cards. This may in fact increase their
adoption in diverse ﬁelds and speciﬁcally for applications that were not traditionally part of smart card services
due to the stringent requirements placed by card issuers in the ICOM.450
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Figure 4: User card management architecture (UCOM [4])
16
User Centric Smart Card (UCSC)
Smart Card Runtime Environment






















Figure 5: Illustration of parasite application problem
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